Significantly, the visits Lange and other foreign experts made to India in the late 1950s did not occur through military intervention. Instead, they focused on diplomacy and scholarly expertise. Rather than arriving in Delhi or Calcutta armed with guns, these experts mostly submitted memoranda and trade deals, and sat on advisory committees. In the late 1950s, political leaders and intellectuals saw Third World development politics, associated with a "domestication of the future" through science, as a hopeful sign.
9 Development politics had not yet become linked to what Albert O. Hirschman later called "development disasters."
10 Moreover, the Cold War superpowers' coercion, armed intervention, and blatant support for military dictatorships did not yet dominate Third World politics. The decisive global turn to insurgency occurred only in the mid-to-late 1960s. Because economic expertise-next to engineering, urban planning, and architecture-became Poland's key export product and diplomatic currency in the Third World between 1956 and 1968, the epistemic and intellectual effects of these encounters are especially relevant.
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As de-Stalinization progressed and Soviet Third World politics expanded, Polish economists' relationship with India became crucial to the evolution of their ideas. Polish leading economists theorized "backwardness," "underdevelopment," and Poland's place in the world in three distinct ways. First, they reassessed the politics of accelerated modernization that emerged from observing the failures of, and obstacles to, Polish and Indian economic transformations. Second, because of the dominance of smallholder farming in India and its revival in 1956 Poland, they shifted attention to the apparent durability of the "peasant economy" vis-à-vis "socialist" and "capitalist" industrialization. Finally, they interacted with economists and Marxist scholars also living or sojourning in India, interactions which helped to soften Eurocentrism in Polish social science.
It is important to note that this post-1956 expert conversation and the transnational conception of shared Polish-Indian modernity arose separately from the Soviet discourse about "solidarity with the oppressed peoples and victims of imperialism." 12 As Poland gained the leeway to set a more independent political and intellectual agenda, radical opposition to agrarian collectivization formed, placing Poland's agrarian policy closer to that of India rather than China or the Soviet Union. 13 Moreover, the 1956 "Polish October," the 13. Nigel Swain, "Eastern European Collectivizations Campaigns Compared, 1945 Compared, -1962 in Constantin Iordachi and Arnd Bauerkamper, eds., The Collectivization of Polish Economists in Nehru's India regime's relatively peaceful liberalization, strengthened the affinity between Oxbridge-educated economists in Poland and India. Their practical exchange of knowledge reflected the genuine lack of personal, intellectual, and political barriers between the Polish experts, their Indian hosts, and western scholars working in India. In the late 1950s, the quest for modernization, planning, and land reforms came to be seen as common ground between eastern Europe and South Asia. This article shows how this shared perception evolved.
I also argue that in Nehru's India, developmental thought's material implementation was neither the only, nor the main, criterion for why certain ideas mattered.
14 "Development Politics," David Engerman's term for the novel mix of international relations, expertise, and financial assistance that emerged during the global Cold War, did not only concern the effective deployment of technical expertise. 15 Leaders like Nehru treated the presence of international experts as an ineluctable part of Cold War diplomacy, and often let their memoranda gather dust-a fact that Polish economists were well aware of. 16 Despite some governmental neglect, by participating in an intellectual network that spanned the postcolonial world, Polish scholars contributed to key global currents of the 1960s, such as peasant studies and the critique of modernization theory. As most historians note, the early Cold War internationalization of Polish social science was not merely due to contacts with the west. The postcolonial world also contributed to and enriched this internationalization. 17 My argument accords with recent historiography that looks at "longer, deeper, and wider" histories of development and opposes the assumption that this history belongs only to the west. 18 I begin with Lange's discussion of post-colonial India during the winters of 1954-55 and 1955-56, when he acted as an economic adviser to Nehru. Lange's intellectual diplomacy and Poland's de-Stalinization set the stage for a uniquely intense exchange between Polish economists and Indian planners. The years 1957-60 heralded the golden age of Polish intellectual engagement in Third World politics, in which the Polish embassy in Delhi played a pivotal role. I then discuss one example of these exchanges: the interaction between Ignacy Sachs, a young Polish diplomat and social scientist, and Daniel Thorner, an American scholar residing in India whose writings on land reforms in colonial and postcolonial "Indian villages" had a significant impact on Polish developmental thought. Next, I examine Michał Kalecki's trip to India in 1959-60. Kalecki's experiences in India confirmed the importance of smallholder peasantry to the economy and for developmental thought in general. His work also marked the shift from a Stalinist discourse of accelerated industrialization to heterodox conceptualization of Third World regimes of development. I conclude by presenting the epistemic effects of the overlapping de-Stalinization of Polish science and the opening of the eastern bloc to the decolonizing world.
Oskar Lange: Stalinism, Economic Diplomacy and India's Bid for Accelerated Modernization
During the mid-1950s, India began to establish itself as a democratic leader of the emerging non-aligned movement. It was also a unique geopolitical space: one of the Cold War's key battlegrounds, where diverse paradigms of technical assistance and economic modernization were introduced and disputed. 19 Lange, who rejected a professorship at the University of Chicago to work for the postwar Polish state, was one of the first celebrities of international economics to be courted by Nehru's planning strategist and director of the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI), Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis. Lange and Mahalanobis may have been introduced around 1946 or 1947 at the United Nations, where Lange served as the Polish representative to the United Nations and Mahalanobis served as a member of the UN Statistical Commission. 20 In July 1952, Mahalanobis invited Lange to spend a year at the ISI; unfortunately, the timing was bad, as Stalin then considered India nothing more than "a tool of Anglo-American imperialism" and saw the (post)colonial world as "at best a sideshow, and at worst a distraction."
21 After Stalin's death, however, the Soviet Union made a remarkable volte-face in its policy toward the Third World, and began to see India as its principal partner in the effort to weaken the western "camp." Lange eventually visited ISI in late 1954, where along with experts from the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, he assisted India's drive toward industrialization. 24 This discourse formed while Lange still maintained a Stalinist persona, and while Poland remained committed to the Stalinist doctrine that communist regimes-with their allegiance to Soviet-style industrialization-were superior to "backward," "capitalist" India.
I draw on both Lange's reports from India to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on his official speeches to trace his creation of the official discourse about the Third World on the eve of de-Stalinization. Lange's experiences in India, I argue, demonstrate the relative social insulation of many of Nehru's advisers. This insulation-and the correspondingly superficial understanding of India-caused Lange to project knowledge gleaned from interwar agrarian Poland on India's backwardness. The final effect was Lange's politically ambiguous style of advisorship. On the one hand, Lange officially affirmed the myth of Stalinist modernization and participated in the Soviet discourse that ranked countries according to their commitment to state-socialist industrialization. 25 On the other hand, Lange's practical recommendations for Mahalanobis and Nehru indicate that his thoughts and advice about underdevelopment and industrialization were more heterodox and distant from official Marxism-Leninism than he would have publicly admitted.
In India, Lange lived the life of an academic celebrity. in a guest room designed for the late Rabindranath Tagore, a Bengali poet and the first non-European Nobel Prize laureate in literature. As programmed activities filled his schedule, Lange had little time for independent research on Indian economics and society. 26 Like most foreign advisers invited to Nehru's India, he relied on data supplied by his hosts. In his leisure time, Lange visited the Taj Mahal and the brand-new Bhakra-Nangal Dam. He also spent several days in Darjeeling "seeing the Himalayas and visiting tea plantations . . . a purely touristic trip," he explained.
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Although Lange later made bold claims about the state of Indian agriculture, he spent only a few hours in the Indian countryside: "In Mysore and Hyderabad we were taken to a village. We talked to peasants and saw their houses," he wrote drily. 28 In that day's report, Lange expressed more enthusiasm about the famous Russian writer Il'ia Erenburg, whom he met later that day at a large party that Nehru organized. Among foreign experts, such a superficial inspection of India was more rule than exception. As one foreign resident in India noted about a group of experts, "a dozen busy Americans, some of distinction in agricultural studies and services, flew out from the States [to India] in January. . . . Ten weeks was all that they could spare from the pressure of their normal duties. They made whirlwind tours of India, got their Report ready by April 3, and flew off again." 29 Lange was one of the experts making "whirlwind tours of India," and this superficial acquaintance with India's complex reality affected the way he thought about Third World (under)development. In saying this, I don't wish to imply that more ethnographically-oriented research would automatically allow Lange to acquire a "deeper" and more "real" knowledge of India. But the lack of depth in his approach caused him to rely on preexisting epistemic dispositions and knowledge of "rural backwardness." He therefore relied heavily on historical comparisons and references to prewar, capitalist Poland and eastern Europe; India's situation "is similar to the one we had here in the thirties," he told a Polish audience in July 1955. He continued, "Seventy percent of these people are smallholder farmers, most of them rural proletariat. Secondly, [I was struck by] an extremely low living standard of that multitude. And thirdly, by the huge social contrasts."
30 Lange took as a template the classbased discourse on Great Depression-era Poland created by Polish Marxist economists and statisticians-a country of smallholder peasantry, handi-26. AMSZ, 12/9/218 (Notatki z pobytu w Indiach rektora Szkoły Głównej Planowania i Statystyki, Oskara Lange, npag).
27. Engerman, "Learning from the East," 40. Polish Economists in Nehru's India crafts, class contrasts, and hidden rural unemployment. 31 "A characteristic phenomenon in the backward country, known also from interwar Poland, is a huge number of small shops in the cities," Lange wrote in an essay about the concept and politics of modern economic backwardness. "The owner of the small shop sits next to a few jars filled with bon-bons, a couple of shoelaces and other merchandise of that kind, waiting for hours until a client comes and buys something. . . . In the countryside, many farmhands are not fully made use of, because the plots are too small to effectively employ the whole family of the owner." 32 In claiming that Poland's past was India's present and Poland's present was India's future, Lange presented the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc as a space of civilizational maturity that decolonizing nations were encouraged to join. 33 This kind of ideological and teleological generalization exemplified a broader attitude in the Soviet Union (as in the United States and Mao's China) to portray decolonization in linear terms, as "evidence of history's global direction." 34 In other words, socialism was a historical necessity. As Khrushchev argued, "the triumph of the Soviet system and communism over the ruins of European colonialism" was simply a matter of time, charting an overarching narrative of progressive, national anti-imperialism. 35 In a 1957 lecture given by Lange, "backward countries" functioned as examples for what would have happened if Poland had remained in capitalism's orbit. 36 If not for its accelerated industrialization, Poland-like India-would still grapple with "the lack of capital, mass unemployment (official and disguised), petty trade as an important source of the population's income, and various forms of speculation and usury." 37 Lange's official interpretation of India as presented in Poland was strictly ideological: it aimed, above all, to legitimize the state socialist project. In his specific recommendations to the Indian government, however, Lange was eclectic. In a memorandum entitled "Some Remarks on India's Second Five-Year Plan," he proposed a method for introducing industrial planning and encouraging a strong public sector "without undermining the framework of capitalist society." 38 Lange even pointed to the British war economy and Nazi Germany's economic plans from the 1930s as important models. He based his planning strategy on "mass mobilization" and advocated public investment in heavy industrialization. Yet it was a planned "capitalist state economy"-not a state socialist one-that was the goal.
Nonetheless, Lange simultaneously attempted to tune in to the epic ambitions of Nehru, who-inspired by Mao's China-wanted the Second Five-Year Plan to be a dramatic accomplishment. 39 Planning was a "word that tantalizes everyone in India," Lange observed, because it contained the promise of lifting India up from its past "sluggishness" and freeing it from "imperial ties" of all kinds. 40 Lange saw the pace of rural change, in motion since 1952 and assisted by American and German experts, as slow, even snail-paced. 41 He thought of agriculture merely as something to be subsumed by the larger task of heavy industrialization that should be achieved through the mobilization techniques typical of a war economy. Despite Nehru's grandly-expressed ambitions, Lange's Indian hosts did not take Lange's epic idea of state-led industrialization literally and Nehru's socialist rhetoric remained just rhetoric.
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A skillful diplomat, Lange habitually masked his personal views. His official discourse on "backward" India and the superiority of Polish state socialism should be taken with a grain of salt. Interestingly, Lange befriended and spent a great deal of time with C. D. Deshmukh, Nehru's Minister of Finance, even though in an official report from February 1955 he described Deshmukh as someone who "tried to hinder bold, state-led industrialization" and was tied to "the international monopoly" and the politics of "economic liberalism." 43 In the Poland of early 1955 it is certain that Lange meant none of these descriptions as a compliment. Whatever Lange's officially expressed views, he made a lasting positive impression on his Indian hosts. In the summer of 1955, when Nehru made a diplomatic visit to Poland, he supposedly said to the Polish chief of government, Józef Cyrankiewicz: "Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for the best gift from Poland-Professor Lange. 
Post-Stalinist Diplomacy and Circulation of New Economic Ideas between Poland and India
From 1948 to 1955 "there was not a single issue with regard to which one can speak of a specifically Polish idea in comparison to foreign policy in the USSR," writes the diplomatic historian Włodzimierz Borodziej. In 1956, however, the "model of indirect rule"-with east European nation-states as formal but not actual sovereign countries-changed, particularly in Poland. 45 On March 20, at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Khrushchev announced the right to a "national path" to socialism. Polish society and many members of the PUWP received the Soviet announcement enthusiastically. But the decisive moment came on October 19, when Polish communists elected Władysław Gomułka as first secretary of the Communist Party without consulting the Soviets. Fearing that social and political unrest in Poland would lead to the disintegration of the eastern bloc, Khrushchev flew to Warsaw and faced Gomułka. 46 It was a tense meeting, but the latter, as Borodziej stressed, "broke the barrier of fear," and convinced the Soviet delegation to accept the new party leadership in exchange for Polish loyalty to the eastern bloc. 47 With the backing of increasingly anti-Soviet China and the ecstatic crowds in Warsaw's streets, Poland could now permit itself more attitudes and activities that diverged from the Soviet line. In striking contrast to Hungary, the Soviets did not pacify the Polish "rebellion" with tanks. Supposedly Khrushchev only complained to Gomułka that "almost all the members of the Polish Politburo have an anti-Soviet attitude and pursue such policies."
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In what follows, I examine the ways in which Poland's de-Stalinization in political and economic policy shaped Poland's relationship with India after 1956. Poland was perhaps the only east European country in the Khrushchev era that to some extent worked toward weakening the divide between socialist and capitalist "camps" without leaving the Soviet bloc (as opposed to Yugoslavia, China, and Albania). Relations with the west improved. The United States, for instance, stepped in with loans and trade deals, and Lange served as Vice President Richard Nixon's personal guide during his visit to Poland in August 1959. 49 New opportunities also opened to the east and south, although not without tensions. In China, after initially supporting the new Gomułka regime, Mao observed Poland's retreat from collectivization with displeasure. As early as the fall of 1957, he expressed concern to the Soviets 55-111; Władysław Góralski, ed., Stosunki polsko-indyjskie po drugiej wojnie światowej (chronologia i bibliografia) (Warsaw, 1985 that "kulaks" and "the influence of bourgeois ideology" were very strong. 50 But Nehru's India greeted the "Polish road to socialism," as Gomułka's slogan put it, with sympathy.
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In November 1956, Polish diplomats noted that "for nationally-minded Indians, Poland had become a country that is autonomous in domestic and foreign affairs" and a state that could more authentically express solidarity with the "national and anti-colonial struggle for self-determination."
52 In 1957, Nehru and his economic strategist, Mahalanobis, were particularly intrigued by a new, market-oriented planning mechanism being prepared for the Polish government by Lange, his renowned colleague Michał Kalecki, and their team. In a November 1957 letter to Lange, Mahalanobis admitted that Polish debates on so-called "indicative planning" better corresponded with India's mixed economy than bureaucratized central planning. 53 He knew that Lange would not be offended when he referred to planning in Poland as "bureaucratized." In past private conversations in India, Lange himself had joked that Soviet planners would "look at the ceiling and then at the floor, rather than consult enterprises, to determine plan targets." 54 This correspondence suggested that Poland, which suddenly became a champion of individual peasant farming and market-oriented state planning, could share with India much more than certain planning techniques.
Meanwhile, Oskar Lange transformed overnight from being an economist accused of "losing contact with reality" and a "defender of Stalinist industrialization" to a proponent of free academic discussion and socialist democratization. 55 Lange surprised the party apparatus and fellow economists by claiming that Soviet-style industrialization brought about socioeconomic "disproportions" and "an undisciplined disorder. Withdrawal from the collectivization of agriculture was the most relevant part of Polish political and economic de-Stalinization. Poland's new agricultural policy constituted a negation of Stalinist principles. As early as July 1956, the co-author of the Polish version of Soviet-style collectivization, Jerzy Tepicht, publicly admitted that thousands of peasants went to jail during Stalinist collectivization for no good reason. 59 In October 1956, the new first secretary, Władysław Gomułka, announced that "the decision to disband collective farms was now left to their members." 60 A massive rush to abandon kolkhozes ensued. Nine thousand of the ten thousand cooperatives spontaneously dissolved during the weeks following his pronouncement. By the end of 1956, non-state family farming generated nearly ninety percent of agricultural production in Poland. 61 The fact that smallholder farming became, once again, one of the chief features of the Polish economy gave Poland a special economic status among eastern bloc countries and, unexpectedly, likened Poland to India with its "mixed economy." 62 In the late 1950s, Poland officially declared India its most important "nonsocialist" partner. 63 The Polish Embassy in Delhi needed experienced diplomats, most of whom had been purged during Stalinism. One such side-tracked diplomat was Juliusz Katz-Suchy, the former Polish ambassador to the United Nations (1947-51), and the brother of Ben-Zion Katz, the rector of Tel Aviv University. Juliusz Katz-Suchy was praised for his wit, eloquence, and ability to "hold a conversation instead of preaching," qualities that aimed to create a less dogmatic-meaning non-Stalinist and more liberal-diplomatic style for Poland. 64 Katz-Suchy's tenure as a new ambassador to India (1957-62) thus marked a new chapter in Polish-Indian relations. India became Poland's window onto the decolonizing world, and, intellectually, a site of reflection on global underdevelopment.
"The Most Difficult Thing to Establish Is a Basic Fact": Marxist Economists and the Empirical Turn
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As Soviet and Polish interests in India grew, the Polish Embassy in Delhi became a place where intellectual exchange on world affairs attracted both the local intelligentsia and international residents. In de-Stalinization's aftermath, many Indian politicians and foreign visitors to Delhi sought Katz-Suchy's informal opinion on eastern European and global issues.
66 Katz-Suchy argued that Poland could offer incomparably more in planning expertise than other eastern bloc countries. It was clear to him, however, that Poland was significantly less powerful than India, which established its position through global Cold War rivalry and maintained profound relations with both the west and the Soviet bloc. Therefore, Poland should be "more proactive" regarding India, because "we care more about having a strong position in India, than India cares about us." Sachs' personal trajectory also spanned continents: his affluent and assimilated Jewish family escaped from Warsaw to Rio de Janeiro in 1939. In Brazil, he met Katz-Suchy, and eventually returned to Warsaw in 1954, where he became Katz-Suchy's assistant at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. Familiar with the economic policies of Brazil and other Latin American countries, Sachs was soon assigned to cover Asia and Africa as well, and became the key Polish expert on decolonization. 68 70 Later on, in La Decouverte du Tiers Monde, his major book published in 1971 in a series overseen by Ferdinard Braudel, Sachs would argue that Bandung was the most important milestone for political cooperation in modern world history. 71 As a Polish embassy secretary and arranger of scientific cooperation between Poland and India, Sachs possessed privileged access to knowledge about Cold War rivalries that shaped development policy in India and other South Asian countries. Since Polish diplomacy in Delhi relied heavily on cultivating cultural and academic relations, Sachs regularly conducted conversations about India's role in the Cold War with leading Indian economists, sociologists, and journalists, reporting on these to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to politics, the talks tackled socioeconomic issues: preparations for the Third Five-Year Plan, foreign investments, land reform, and international trade. Sachs also interviewed Indian experts in rural studies on ethnic and religious tensions, the caste system, and even Indian philosophy. 72 In return, Sachs briefed Indian social scientists on economic reforms and the Lange/Kalecki planning innovations that could assist India's Third Five-Year Plan. 73 The intellectual affinity between Polish and Indian scholars that Sachs facilitated rested on a mutual understanding of what makes progressive nation-building "modern": the key was economics, a language common to both countries' left-wing elites. Amir Badhuri, a Bengali intellectual and proponent of Michał Kalecki, recalled that in the 1950s and 60s, "studying economics was intellectually 'fashionable' and I also felt that it would give me a better grasp of political issues." 74 Lange, Kalecki and their Indian peers knew British Keynesian macroeconomics, and had studied or worked at Oxford and Cambridge. Both groups believed that Keynesian general theory did not quite apply outside the west and that the economics' subdiscipline of development economics was needed to capture the specific circumstances of so-called "underdeveloped" countries. 75 Both Polish and Indian economists rejected one-size-fits-all western theories of growth, yet, at the same time were enchanted with model-building, economic theory, and advanced mathematical statistics. Amartya Sen, a star of the Delhi School of Economics (and, later, a guest in Warsaw), believed that "neoclassical economics was deeply defective, but it enabled Indian economists to argue with it or run alongside." 76 Above all, however, the political economic foundation of this scholarship was Marxism. "In the D. School, anyone who did not subscribe to Marxism and leftist politics was suspect," wrote the school's leading agrarian sociologist. 77 As Sachs recalled of his three years in India: "To somebody coming with a Latin-American background, a reasonable knowledge of Marxian economics, and the East European experience, the confrontation was very enriching indeed." Sachs emphasized that the D. School a unique mix of advanced economic thinking, "had more to offer than any Western-based academic institution."
78 Immersed since his youth in the experiences of the southern hemisphere, Sachs believed that acknowledging the end of Eurocentrismprecipitated by the Shoah, which was the end point of the white, western ideal of humanity-was integral to a modern progressive sensibility. He saw India as the global center of this intellectual movement. 79 One result of the transcontinental scholarly dialogue mediated by the Polish embassy was Ignacy Sachs's PhD thesis in development economics, Patterns of Public Sector in Underdeveloped Economies. Full of details of backstage debates on the execution of India's Second Five-Year Plan, the dissertation reflected the complexities and day-to-day problems of Indian planning. Sachs intended it as "a comparative study of state interventionism," specifically of Brazilian and Indian industrializations. 80 But the value of the SouthSouth comparison lay in the stress Sachs placed on the difficulties of economic growth politics in India and other parts of the decolonizing world, including the persistent problems of undercapitalization, and, most of all, the continuing failures of land reforms. Sachs distanced himself from dogmatic Marxist developmental economics, a position still uncommon in the late 1950s. One of the reviewers, the only tenured Marxist economist in the United States, Paul A. Baran, even rejected the thesis, calling it "bashful Marxism." 81 Sachs developed his Third-World-centric empiricism thanks to his privileged access to a network of prominent unorthodox Marxists-and above all to Daniel Thorner. Thorner (1917-74) was a resident foreign expert in Delhi and Calcutta and an economic historian of the Indian countryside. "American by birth, and Indian by adoption," Thorner was yet another left-wing Marxist Polish Economists in Nehru's India scholar in India who flouted Cold War divisions, "ignored borders" and "hated injustices," as Sachs wrote. 82 Like Kalecki, Sachs, and Katz-Suchy, Thorner had a Polish-Jewish background. He grew up in the United States, but after losing his job in the South Asian Studies Program at the University of Pennsylvania during the McCarthy era, he and his wife Alicia moved to India, where they worked from 1952 until 1960. Over time, Thorner and his wife became responsible for the Indian Statistical Institute's census research project, a sign of great respect on the part of Indian officials, who affectionately referred to Thorner as "an Indian economist." In 1960, Daniel Thorner and his wife were invited by Fernard Braudel to create a new program of Indian studies in the Sixième Section de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris. 83 From Thorner, Sachs learned how to combine economics with empirical and historical perspectives to engage critically with the Eurocentrism of contemporary developmental thought. 84 This helped Sachs and other Warsaw scholars to focus on the predicament of smallholder farmers in India, where at the time of independence nearly eighty percent of the population lived on land or depended on agriculture. Thorner liked to rely on two historical traditions he thought were key to understanding the problems of development in Nehru's India. The first involved studies by the British colonial agronomist Harold Mann on the "Indian village" (1917-21). The other involved Russian zemstvo statistics and Aleksandr V. Chaianov's works on the peasant economy, which had circulated in India in German translations since the 1920s. 85 This body of knowledge about village betterment made plain that the peasantry's standard of living, employment, and ways of cultivating land were central to understanding India's economy and chances for economic growth. 86 Thorner referred to the historical science of "land and labor" present in early twentieth-century Europe, Asia, and Africa, and argued that modernization plans required a longue durée approach.
Sachs built on Thorner's thoughts to recommend analyzing the Indian economy in light of historical regimes of land property that, he argued, had hindered postcolonial land reform. "India had a unique agrarian structure," Thorner claimed, "blending remnants from the pre-British economic order and Western concepts of private property." 87 In this structure, middlemen and usurers who exploited and indebted the lowest castes were the Indian village's major problems. Despite Nehru's anti-debt legislation and U.S.-sponsored experiments in community farming, the effort to undo the web of exploitation by village intermediaries failed, and contributed to recurring famines. 88 Thorner's writings from the 1950s criticized epistemic practices of international development that in many ways resembled turn-of-the-twentiethcentury Methodenstreit, the methodological debate among central European economists about the importance of historical particularities and universals in economic science. 89 Thorner indicted the superficiality of international development economics and its inability to study local data with historical awareness. He sarcastically divided western experts dedicated to what Albert Hirschman called "monoeconomics" into the naïve, the technocratic, and those who consciously "ignored specificity of economic backwardness in developing countries." "The toughest thing to establish for the Indian countryside was a simple fact," he stressed. 90 Dismissing advisers, fellow Americans in particular, as "theoreticians," he believed that technical assistance should start "in the dust, mud, and swampy terrain of villages, while field investigators . . . must have some comprehension of the larger analytical issues involved." 91 Thorner himself visited nearly a hundred villages, always arriving on foot so that villagers would not identify him as a state official or foreign aid worker. 92 Thorner rediscovered this historical agrarian studies and that Sachs disseminated further to prominent scholars like Polish historian Witold Kula. Their ideas reconnected with the structuralist thinking and social statistics that had reigned in the western and non-western worlds alike before the global rise of the Soviet perspective on industrialization and the modernization theory during the early Cold War. With characteristic asperity, Thorner observed that those who studied "today's problems of the Third World seemed to be unaware that they were traversing much the same ground as several generations of Russian economists from the 1860s to the 1920s." He argued that this was why, despite multiple plans and reforms, India had changed so little. 94 Soon afterwards, Lange returned to his western-style econometrics, and Kalecki supported the retreat from the collectivization of agriculture and lectured on the importance of living standards in the politics of growth.
95 These developments were on Kalecki's mind during his stay in India in 1959-60, when he insisted-though without success-that the Indian government should base its economic policy on improving the lives of the rural poor. Despite Kalecki's cool relationship with Nehru, India became one of the models for Kaleckian development economics. In the 1960s, planners and economists from Africa, Asia, and Latin America studied Kalecki's work extensively.
Kalecki did not promise miracles to his Indian hosts. On the contrary, he proposed a way of financing the Third Five-Year Plan, debated in 1959-60, that took seriously "the low living standard of the Indian masses" and India's existing political-economic regime, which he called "state capitalism." "I suggested a solution which I find neither the most justified nor most effective," Kalecki wrote in a memorandum for Nehru's government; rather, he recommended what seemed most feasible. When one Indian official asked why Kalecki did not recommend a comprehensive systemic change, he responded, "If a country wants to change the whole economic system, it makes revolution instead of inviting foreign advisors." 96 Kalecki's writings from his time in India, which were poorly received politically, informed two tenets of his internationally-influential conception of development economics. The first was his focus on the rural poor, a focus that united his prior expertise on interwar, "backward" Poland and his observation of Indian economic life. The second was the concept of the "intermediate regime," a model of the postcolonial state-capitalist economy that Kalecki based in part on experiences in Nehru's India. Kalecki reinforced an empirical and peasantry-centered approach to the politics of growth that influenced how Poles delivered development economics to the Third World in the 1960s. In India, Kalecki was praised as "probably the most significant of the now-neglected voices among twentieth-century economists." 97 But while fellow economists admired Kalecki, politicians often gave him the cold shoulder. Kalecki left Poland in 1936 as a Rockefeller Fellow. His absence, which lasted nearly twenty years, not only saved his life-he was Jewish-but also made Kalecki an international leader in modern macroeconomics. After a short stay in Sweden in 1936, he went to England, where he worked as an academic and governmental expert in wartime Cambridge and Oxford (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) . From 1946 to 1954, Kalecki worked at the United Nations Secretariat, where, in addition to contributing to many other projects, he prepared the World Economic Survey, which included an economic survey of India. 98 Despite his international fame, at home Kalecki saw his projects dismissed or rejected. In December 1959, one of Kalecki's students called the Economic Council Kalecki co-chaired "a textbook example of the rejection of an alien body in a basically preserved autocratic structure." 99 As Władysław Gomułka steered Poland away from democratization in the late 1950s, Kalecki and his collaborators compensated by undertaking development work in the Third World.
In his Indian work, Kalecki focused on the problem of rural poverty. Agriculture, in his view, was the core of welfare-oriented developmental economics-not just a resource for "primitive accumulation." Kalecki argued for a type of state interventionism that would support the poor peasantry at the expense of more prosperous rural middlemen and wealthy landowners. He deduced that the rural poor would profit from indirect taxation on goods consumed by the richer strata, an idea that Amartya Sen, the Indian Nobel Prize laureate in economics, developed further. 100 Kalecki also advocated for bolder land reforms to eliminate endemic usury, together with the sizable cohort of agrarian and trade middlemen who exploited the rural poor. As noted previously, these proposals were popular among the left-wing Indian intelligentsia and progressive foreign experts like Thorner. The changing political economy of decolonization corresponded with shifts in agrarian politics in Poland. De-Stalinization spurred the revival of the smallholder peasantry, Poland's poorest social group, and made Kalecki's focus on the rural poor more prominent in Polish developmental thought. This focus also revived the legacy of social research describing agrarian, interwar Poland that Kalecki gathered during the Second Polish Republic (1918-39). 109 In the 1930s, he also belonged to a group of Marxist economists in Poland who developed the concept of "hidden rural unemployment." Kalecki had argued that interwar Poland required a different understanding of unemployment, one able to capture the specificity of a non-industrialized country, and in India he advocated for a separate economics for "backward" or (post-1945) "underdeveloped" countries. By reconnecting with his own interwar studies on peasant-dominated economies, Kalecki-not unlike Thorner-challenged the mainstream American modernization theory and Soviet discourse on the Third World.
Conclusion: De-centering the West, or What We Can Learn from Transnational Currents of Knowledge during the Cold War
While global Cold War rivalry in South Asia enabled Polish-Indian intellectual diplomacy, the scholarship was not merely a bipolar "Cold War science." One needs to read this scholarship through the wider historical perspective suggested by David Engerman: it is "social science in the Cold War." 110 Poland was unique in that its de-Stalinization led to the liberalization of Polish politics, foreign relations, and science, and thus made possible a more heterodox stance. Polish economists's developmental models contained a multi-layered epistemic object: the syncretic smallholder peasant, a figure which merged continents and time periods-Europe and Asia, the interwar decades, and the Cold War era. This heterodox knowledge explains, for instance, why the shift toward a critical empiricism and a focus on smallholder peasantry was not a mere offstage whisper; rather, these ideas were voiced publicly by Polish economists going to the Third World in the late 1950s and 1960s. In the Thaw's aftermath, the historical legacy of central and east European social Polish Economists in Nehru's India science became apparent, and the science internationalized in new ways both because and in spite of the Cold War.
Furthermore, Polish economic contributions to India were not a simple bilateral affair. On the contrary, these contributions were an important part of transnational circuits of knowledge. They were as much a part of the post-1956 revival of heterodox Marxism as they were the revival of village and peasant studies, which had simultaneously emerged in early twentieth-century Europe and colonial India. Ferdinand Braudel's well-known statement about the "peasant economy"-that it was "a distinct socioeconomic formation capable of persisting under slavery, capitalism and state socialism"-was directly informed by intellectual exchanges enabled by Nehru's global diplomacy. 111 Indian debates, which engaged local scholars, foreign experts like Lange or Kalecki, and dissident western scholars like Thorner, traveled back to Europe to foster a new, more global understanding of social science. Scholars also forged new intellectual connections that cut across the politics of superpowers.
India thus became a geopolitical gateway for both the global Cold War and a multilateralism that expanded existing international networks and created new intellectual affinities between experts. In terms of official politics, the "Indian experience" contributed greatly to the institutionalization of developmental thought in communist Poland. While in Delhi, Kalecki came up with the idea of creating the Warsaw Center of Research on Underdeveloped Economies. Unsurprisingly, Kalecki ensured that Ignacy Sachs was appointed as director and Oskar Lange to the scientific board. 112 The three men also created the Advanced Course in Planning for Economists from Developing Countries. From 1962 until 1968, the center trained nearly two hundred experts from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, while raising concerns among the Americans (for, arguably, its "lack of dogmatism") and causing pangs of jealousy among the Soviets. 113 In the 1960s, both institutions hosted several top Indian economists-Amartya Sen, K.N. Raj, and K. Naqvi-as well as a small but highly-accomplished group of South Asian PhD students. The institutions also trained many rank-and-file functionaries, academics, and professionals who would later serve as resident technical advisers or employees in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The Indian network became vital in the years of political unrest of the late 1960s, especially when anti-Semitic and anti-intelligentsia purges decimated Kalecki's circle in 1968. The Thorners'
